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. INTRODUCTION
Zimbabwe experienced scvcrc cpal shortages inthelatc 1980s when the 
National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) failed to transport coal from the 
single colliery (Wankie) then in operation in the country to the consumption 
centres. This caused problems in a number of'industries across the country. 
Some industries, particularly the tobacco, electricity1 generation, and’sugar 
industries, which use a lot of coal in their operations were seriously affected’ 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the problems experienced by the NRZ as 
highlighted during this coal crisis which reached a peak in 1988 and T989.
Transport organisations exist to move people and/or gObds such that 
demand is met as scheduled arid safely. If they do not satisfy this basic 
principle then they would have; failed. Although a,variety of transport 
problems exist, those relating to the operation of transport systems have been 
researched more than those pertaining to engineering and the socio-political 
functions of transport The former area o f  research includes problems with 
movement schedules; dispatch policies, vehicle sizes and routing patterns/ 
Forcxamplc, Crane (1968) expiored tlic possibility of using aircraft Sim ulation 
models to predict the movement of trains. Edwards (1975) modelled the 
operations of Britain’s railway system in .order to improve its operations, 
while Crainic, Florian and Lcal (1990) have recently developed a general 
framework for improving railway operations in the movement of freight. 
This paper discusses some of the problems of railway opcratioh'common in 
developing countries using the railway system of Zimbabwe as a'case study.
THE RAILW AYS AND NATIONAL TRANSPORT IN 
-ZIM BABW E--.'' ■ ■
There were several'political and economic forces behind the development 
of railways in Southern Africa. The dominant of the two groups of forces is 
subject to debate (Gibb, 1991; Hanlon, 1984; Mwase, 1987). The initial 
political factor was Cecil Rhodes’ concept of a Cape-to-Cairo railway line 
and this has been augmented by contemporary political objectives (Gibb, 
1991; Griffiths, 1989). On the other hand, in Zimbabwe in particular, the
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major economic factors were firstly, the desire to provide transport 
infrastructure to serve the emerging mining and farming enterprises from the 
late nineteenth century and secondly, to provide trade links to the seaports 
of Mozambique and South Africa for the landlocked country. Indeed, the 
railways have been an essential component of economic, social and political 
development with considerable influence on the Southern African regional 
space economy (Pirie, 1982).
The economic role of the railways in Zimbabwe has not changed much 
over the decades. This has been identified as being to ‘provide and maintain 
... an efficient system of public transport of goods and passengers by rail’ 
(Rhodesia Railways Act, 1973). The system developed as an integral part of 
the national economy such that it had to be nationalised in 1947 when the 
private owners, Rhodesia Railway (Pvt) Ltd, could not finance the 
rehabilitation required after it had been run down during the Second World 
War.
Infrastructure
Line construction started in 1892 from Mozambique and in 1893 from 
South Africa and all the main and major branch lines were constructed over 
the next 30 years to lay the framework of the present network (Figure 1). The 
lines focussed on the major urban centres of Salisbury (now Harare), 
Bulawayo, Gwelo (Gweru) and Umtali (Mutare) and traversed through the 
main fanning and mining regions of the country. There have been only a few 
minor additions to this initial alignment. Today the total route distance is 
2 759 km of which over 90% is single track while some 1 575 km are 
managed through a centralised train control system. Some 311 km of the 
track are electrified.
In 1989 the NRZ owned 422 locomotives and 13 231 freight wagons 
(NRZ, 1989). The locomotives consisted of 88 steam, 304 diesel and 30 
electric locomotives. The steam locomotives were mainly used on the 
southern section of the network close to Wankie colliery in the northwest of 
the country, both for mainline operations and for shunting purposes in the 
marshalling yards. (The southern section is the part of the network from 
Bannockburn, 79 km southwest of Gweru through Bulawayo to Hwange in 
the northerwest and Plumtrec in the west -  see Figure 1). The electric 
locomotives are exclusively for the electrified section between Dabuka near 
Gweru and Harare while the diesel locomotives are extensively used on all 
sections of the network.
The freight wagons on the system arc generally classified into three 
categories: highsided, dropsided, and covered wagons. In 1989 these numbered 
7 540, 2 358 and 1 154 wagons respectively. The remainder of the total
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wagon stock comprised specialised container, livestock, refrigerator, tank, 
and explosives wagons. Whilst the highsided general purpose wagons are 
used for conveying general cargo such as cement, coal, maize, sugar and 
wheat, dropsided wagons are ideally suited to carrying heavier commodities 
like asbestos, copper, salt, stones, and other heavy metal products. The NRZ 
stock of wagons is usually supported by a strong contingent of South African. 
wagons which averaged 6 700 per day in 1989 (NRZ, 1989).
Traffic is hauled mostly between pairs of around 640 private terminals 
(Turton, 1988). The five large marshalling yards which are an important part 
of the system are located at Hwange, Bulawayo, Gweru, Harare and Mutare. 
The Dabuka marshalling yard in Gweru forms the hub of the operations of 
the NRZ operations as a central traffic sorting yard while the Harare yard at 
Lochinvar also serves as the container terminal for the railway network. 
Table 1 shows the wagon flow capacities in one direction for the five
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marshalling yards. The capacities do not represent the actual traffic dealt 
with, as the latter is generally well below these expected maximum amounts 
(NRZ, 1989; Swedish International Development Agency, 1985).
TABLE 1:
NRZ M ARSHALLING YARDS WAGON FLOW  CAPACITIES
PER DAY
Yard Number of wagons 
per day 
(one-way)
Thomson Junction 630
(Hwange)
Mpopoma 1 000
(Bulawayo)
Dabuka 3 000 to
(Gweru) 4 000
Lochinvar 860
(Harare)
Mutare 384
Source: NRZ, 1989
Traffic
The NRZ carries about 90% of all domestic medium to long distance 
freight in the country (SIDA, 1985). The amount of freight traffic carried 
over the past twenty years is shown in Figure 2. The railway still serves its 
initial role as a means for promoting industrial, agricultural and mining 
activities as reflected in its traffic composition of which minerals comprised 
20% and agricultural products.27% of total freight carried in 1989 (NRZ, 
1989).
The internal freight composition is dominated by shipments of coal and­
iron ore. These two traffic types started receiving particular attention from 
1975 when speci alised wagons were introduced for their movement (Croxton, 
1982). The operations of these “liner trains” are, however, largely focussed 
on the iron and steel plant at Redcliff near Kwekwe. On average coal 
accounted for 23% of the total freight carried each year between 1986 and 
1989. The movements of other types of traffic are more dispersed as a result 
of the spatial distribution of mining, farming and industrial activities.
TH E RAILWAYS AND THE M OVEM ENT OF COAL
Coal was first discovered in the Hwange area of Zimbabwe in 1893 
though shaft sinking only began in 1901 and the coal seam was reached in
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Transit Import Export Local
Figure 2: Freight carried by the NRZ, 1968 -  1988
(Net tonnes excluding on-rail services)
Source: NRZ, 1989 -
1902 (Government of Rhodesia, 1973). The present estimated coal reserves 
in the country are 30 000 million tonnes distributed over23 fields(Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1988). However, production is still largely from; one 
colliery, the Wankie Colliery at Hwange (Figured). Production from this, 
colliery averages some 4 million tonnes per annum, while the recently 
developed colliery at Sengwa, south of Lake Kariba, is expected to produce 
200 000 tonnes yearly.
The main users of coal in the country are the paper production, mining, 
textile, sugar refining, tobacco farming and electricity generation industries. 
The electricity generation industry is the single largest consumer especially 
after a big thermal power station in Hwange was brought on-line in two 
phases in 1983 and 1987.
Most of the other major coal consumers are urban-based industries to 
the east of the colliery. Table 2 shows estimated coal consumption by town 
and its hinterland in 1988/89. th e  railway moves most of the coal using a 
wagonload system. This is because the fairly large volumes and distances 
involved give the railway a competitive advantage over other modes of
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transport. Coal deliveries from the colliery to each major destination average 
15 000 tonnes per annum over a distance of 485 km (Kunaka, 1990).
TABLE 2:
APPROXIM ATE COAL CONSUM PTION FOR SELECTED  
CENTRES, 1988/89
Town Coal consumed 
in ’000 tonnes
Bulawayo 385
Harare 285
Munyali 220
Gweru 60
Chinhoyi 48
Mulare 32
Marondera 19
Source: NRZ, 1989.
Past coal movement problems
The operations of the Wankie Colliery are ‘irrevocably interlocked 
with that of the railways, on which colliery clearance and expansion 
depends’ (Government of Southern Rhodesia, 1949). There have, however, 
been instances when the railways have not been able to provide adequate 
clearance of coal at the colliery.
The first notable coal crisis in Zimbabwe occurred soon after the end 
of the Second World War in 1945. During the war period the country’s 
railways had enjoyed a boom in both passenger and freight traffic (Table 3). 
The large increases in traffic were a result of movements of troops and war 
materials. Restrictions on private fuel consumption during the war years also 
contributed to the increase in the number of passengers carried.
The increases in traffic combined with the small amounts of war-time 
capital expenditure resulted in the running down of the system by the end of 
the war. At the same time, the war had stimulated local industry which 
continued to grow after 1945, resulting in an increase in traffic for the railway 
company (Croxton, 1982). The post-war industrial expansion also resulted 
in increased imports of plant and machinery through Mozambican and South 
African ports (Rhodesia Railways, 1947). There was a particularly strong 
movement of import traffic from South Africa northwards into the country. 
The railway found it difficult to cope with the demand with the existing 
wagon stock and this was exacerbated by congestion in the yards, resulting
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TABLE 3
CHANGES IN TRAFFIC MOVED BY TH E RAILW AYS, 
1939 and 1944
1939 1944 % change
Tonnages’ 3 118 782 ■' 4 658 222 +49.4%"
Passengers 1 021758 ■ 2 486 315 +143.3%
Source: Croxton, 1982.
in long wagon turn-round times. (Turn-round time is defined as the time 
period between consecutive, wagon loadings and is usually measured in 
days). South African wagons and locomotives were then employed to deal 
with'the rise in traffic (Croxton, 1982). However, the railway found it 
increasingly difficult tp move its own wagons into the southern section of the 
network as the number of South African wagons increased, resulting in a 
shortage of domestic wagons in this section (Rhodesia Railways, 1947). By 
the late 1940s the country was experiencing some coal shortages because the 
railway could not supply enough wagons for loading at the Wankie colliery. 
The shortage was exacerbated by the drought in 1947 which resulted in the 
redirection of railway wagons to ferry drought relief food to affected areas 
(RhodesiaRailways, 1948). The reduced colliery loadings adversely affected 
powerproduction and also resulted in some coal-intensive mining operations 
being curtailed. Small consumers were particularly affected with the railways 
receiving numerous complaints of late coal deliveries (Government of 
Southern Rhodesia, 1949).
A variety of strategies were adopted by- both the colliery and the 
railways to solve the coal problem in the late 1940s. The railways imposed 
embargoes on the use of South African wagons on its system as this would 
allow its own wagons to be moved through the southern section of the 
network to the Wankie Colliery. Some wagons normally used to,carry 
chrome were employed in the short-term to ferry coal from the colliery to the 
principal consumption centres. Coal consumers were also encouraged to off­
load wagons quickly to reduce wagon tum-round times.
At Wankie, the daily requirement of 322 coal wagon loadings was 
higher than the colliery’s loading capacity and mechanical coal handling 
facilities had to be installed to cope with the demand (Croxton, 1982). In 
addition the. government encouraged consumers to stockpile coal in case of 
future inability to deliver by the railways (Government of Southern Rhodesia, 
1949). The colliery also established storage facilities to assist in loading and
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improve wagon turn-round. The coal problem was, however, to repeat itself 
in the late 1980s.
The 1988-89 coal crisis
In the late 1980s the NRZ appeared, at least in theory, to have the 
capacity to cater for future increases in traffic. Both the yards and tracks were 
operating below their design capacities. However, even though there were no 
dramatic rises in traffic in 1988 and 1989, the corporation found it difficult 
to cope with the demand for its services. The performance measures o f  the 
corporationrapidly deteriorated. The average turn-round time for all wagons 
rose from 11.9 days in 1988 to 14.1 days in 1989 (NRZ, 1989). Even more 
dramatic was the drop in average wagon-kilometres per day, a measure o f  
wagon use similar to turn-round time, which fell from 55 wagon-kilometres 
per day in 1986 to 42 wagon-kilometres per day in 1989 (Figure 3). .
A wagon census inlate 1988 showed that on average 80% o f all wagons 
were lying idle in a marshalling yard on any one day (NRZ, 1989). During 
the 1988-89 financial year the railways had a massive operating deficit o f
Figure 3: NRZ -  Average wagon-kilom etres per day, 
1974-1989
Source: NRZ Annual Reports
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ZW$ 116 million as well as receiving arecord number of customer complaints 
(NRZ, .1989). The large number of South African wagons and locomotives 
on the NRZ network also reflected its poor performance. South African 
wagons averaged 6 700. per day in 1989 whilst ideally, they should not 
exceed 3000 (Kunaka, 1990). The failure of the railways was most apparent 
in its coal.operations.,
From the mid-1980s, culminating in the crisis of 1988/89, the railways 
was unable to move the coal requirements, of the main consumers as per 
scheduled demand. The inconsistencies and delays in delivery resulted in 
considerable disruptions to industrial operations in the major centres of the 
country: For example, inflate 1988 some companies which use a lot of coal 
resorted to shorter working weeks while the; national electricity generation 
corporation had to temporarily shut.down one of its thermal power stations 
when coal reserves ran low. In May 1989 the colliery itself was on the brink 
of closure when wagon loadings fell to 50% of their normal levels and coal 
storage costs increased sharply as.aresultof the accumulation of large stocks 
on site (EIU, 1989). :Evendnrnid-1990 the sugar refining industry in the 
country was still reporting .that deliveries were on average. 14 days behind 
schedule while the electricity corporation reported.severe coal shortages at 
three, of its four thermal power stations, with one having only eight days 
supply of coal forpower generation (Kunaka, 1990). The only thennal power 
station not affected by the shortage was the one located at Hwange which is 
fed directly from the;cplliery by a conveyor.belt.
i The National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) blamed its unreliable coal 
freight operations on a shortage of both wagons and locomotives. Some of 
the main consumers, particularly the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 
the Zimbabwe .Sugar Association and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority also gave the same reasons as the major causes of the shortage of 
coal (Kunaka, 1990). The operational causes of the crisis are discussed 
below. ■ -  v
Causes of the 1980s crisis
The coal crisis.'ofthe late 1980s was a product of similar problems to 
those of the late 1940s. A number of interrelated factors can be identified.
Firstly," the railway experienced a boom in traffic in the mid-1970s 
(Figure 2) with traffic levels only surpassed in the late 1980s. This was a 
repetition of the boom of the early 1940s and is likely to have contributed to 
a similar wearing down of the system. The civil war in the country in the late 
1970s also contributed to the deterioration ofthe system through sabotage 
and the lack of proper maintenance and capital investment.
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Secondly, the railway system which had been rehabilitated in the 1950s 
was worn down by the 1980s given the expected economic life of locomotives, 
in particular the diesel and steam locomotives. For example, in 1988 the 
engines broke down on average once every 7 300 km for steam locomotives, 
every 16 000 km for diesel and every 53 000 km for electric locomotives 
compared to ideal rates of 15 000,50 000, and 60 000 km respectively (NRZ, 
1988). This resulted in poor locomotive availability. The NRZ (1989) 
identified a number of related contributory factors pertaining to maintenance 
problems. These included locomotives spending too much time on 
maintenance due to lack of spare parts, backlogs in maintenance with an 
average of only 185 of the total engine stock actually running at any given 
time, and poor maintenance quality arising from inadequately skilled staff as 
it was difficult to replace white retirees. The shortage of foreign currency was 
a strong contributory factor to the maintenance and stock replacement 
problems of the railway.
Thirdly, the number of South African wagons on the system was 
relatively high, causing wagon distribution problems as in the earlier crisis. 
Some of the South African stock had been brought in as a temporary measure 
to alleviate NRZ shortages as a result of foreign currency problems. The 
South African wagons had to be constantly moved southwards towards 
South Africa as the NRZ paid for the time they spent on its system (Chiwara, 
1988). This had the effect of delaying the movement of the NRZ’s own 
wagons on the same tracks, given the single track system.
Fourthly, the coal crisis coincided with the breakdown of the Kafue 
hydro-electric power station in Zambia from where some electrical power is 
imported into Zimbabwe. The breakdown at Kafue necessitated an increase 
in local power production from Zimbabwe’s own thermal stations, entailing 
increased coal requirements.
Fifthly, new regional transport requirements brought about by the 
independence of Zimbabwe and the formation of the Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) also contributed to the 
crisis. One of the major objectives of SADCC through its Southern African 
Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) has been to reduce 
the use of the South African transport system by its member states (SADCC, 
1988). However, most of the railway systems in the SADCC countries are 
relatively inefficient as illustrated by differences in average turn-round times 
for NRZ wagons entering the South African system and the other regional 
systems (Table 4). The increased use of these other systems with their high 
turn-round times meant a reduction in the number of wagons available for 
loading within Zimbabwe itself, although the total number of NRZ wagons 
on the Mozambican, Zairean and Zambian systems was not very large.
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TABLE 4:
AVERAGE W AGON TURN-AROUND TIMES FOR NRZ  
WAGONS ON OTHER REGIONAL RAILW AY SYSTEM S, 1989
Country Turn-round time 
in days
RSA 8
Botswana 8
Mozambique-Beira line 12
Mozambique-Maputo line 14
Zambia/Zaire 26
Source: NRZ, 1989.
A combination of the above factors resulted in the available wagons 
spending considerable amounts of time in sidings or yards awaitinglocomotive 
power. A simulation study in 1990 showed that the major manifestation of 
the problems experienced by the railway in the late 1980s was the excessive 
delays to wagons in the marshalling yards (Kuriaka, 1990). The longer the 
delays encountered by a wagon fleet the larger the total number of wagons 
that were required to mo ve the traffic even if that traffic rem ained constant. 
Kunaka (1990) found 'that the tracks were coping well even though the 
system is largely single track. They were, therefore, not responsible for the 
delays'experienced in freigh movement.
Solutions to the late 1980s crisis
The railways obviously required considerable amounts of money for 
capital expenditure to replace its old stock, in particular locomotives and 
wagons. An operations improvement plan drawn up in late 1989 addressed 
a variety of problems that had been identified (NRZ, 1989). One of strategies 
was the re-organisatiori of the corporation to give more authority to its 
regional offices and reduce bureaucracy. The other main issues considered 
in the plan are discussed below under three sub-headings: locomotives, 
wagons and marshalling yards.
A programme to rationalise the.locomotive types from the 13 which 
were in operation up to the crisis to 3 or 4 types was proposed. This strategy 
has two obvious attractions. It would make the acquisition of locomotives 
and spare parts easier and would streamline maintenance procedures.
One of the first strategies with respect to wagons was to reduce the 
number of South African wagons within the NRZ system. This would cut 
down on the costs incurred in using these wagons as well as make movement
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and monitoring of the NRZ’s own wagons easier by de-congesting the 
system.. Wagons specifically designed to carry certain types of freight were 
to be introduced with the aim of achieving efficiency in their use and 
reducing underloading which had been a regular occurrence in the past. 
Internal demurrage, that is charging railway departments or sections, was 
also introduced in order to avoid excessive hold-ups of wagons within the 
railways. Wagons were also to be scraped and replaced on time in order to 
cut down on maintenance of obsolete stock and to free the tracks.
Proposed yard strategies varied from streamlining operations to 
improvement of the productivity of train crews. Trains were to be dealt with 
on a first-in-first-out basis, thus running trains on the dictates of traffic.. In 
addition, the railways was to run wagons with similar freight or common 
destinations as blocks to reduce the need for shunting during a train journey. 
The other major yard strategy was to create more re-fuelling and crew 
exchange facilities within the yards in order to speed up operations by cutting 
down on the time taken to perform such activities. -
A long-term plan has also been drawn up for the railways. The plan 
focusses mainly on replacing and modernising the railway rolling stock and 
was expected to cost ZW$700 million over a ten-year period from 1989 (The 
Herald, 5 April 1991). The programme has obtained World Bank backing 
and is expected to result in the full implementation of the above strategies and 
particularly the replacement of locomotives and wagons as well as signal and 
other control systems. The plan is intended to improve the general operations 
of the NRZ, and not just its freight operations. The effects of some of the 
short-term strategies aimed at improving operations are already beginning to 
emerge. By early 1991 the NRZ could point to two main achievements 
arising from the strategies which had been adopted to deal with the problems 
itfaced (The Herald, 30 April.1991). These were, firstly, the reduction in the 
number of South African wagons to 2 000 and secondly, 70%. of the. traffic 
was now being ferried directly: between origin and destination thereby 
reducing transit times. Some shippers were getting their goods within 48 
hours of the start of a shipment.
CONCLUSION
Coal was not the only type of freight traffic experiencing movement 
problems during the period under review. Rather it was the most significant 
traffic affecting a number of industries simultaneously and exposing some 
of the major weaknesses in Zimbabwe’s railway system. The initial 
improvements to operations initiated in 1989 were achieved by streamlining 
procedures and restructuring operations without any new infrastructure 
being injected. The short period within which these preliminary improvements
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were made suggests that some of the major causes of the crisis were internal 
to the railways and included the management structure of the NRZ. Transport 
organisations in developing countries, especially large ones such as the 
railways, suffer from a number of management problems reflected in short­
sighted planning, lack of proper operational goals and persistent crisis 
management.
The relationship between transport and the economy in developing 
countries is also influential in amplifying the problems of rail traffic 
movement. This arises from domination of some categories of traffic by one 
mode of transport. If that mode experiences short-term problems the effects 
on the economy under such monopoly conditions will be much greater 
compared to those experienced under more competitive transport regimes.
The major transport problems in most developing countries are those 
of poor management, insufficient maintenance and delayed replacement of 
stock. The principal cause of the latter problem is lack of finance within the 
country in general, but even more important, in the transport sector. Once the 
basic infrastructure has been provided there is usually a lack of commitment 
on the part of governments to provide adequate funding for maintenance 
purposes. In most cases this is because maintenance does not allow for the 
“public tape cutting” which goes with the initial opening of such infrastructure 
and ittherefore drops inpriority in the allocationof scarce national resources. 
The benefits of regular maintenance of transport infrastructure are less 
obvious than when a facility is first constructed. So transport problems 
degenerate to crisis dimensions before they are dealt with. Unfortunately, 
this may result in sub-optimum solutions or concentration on short-term 
solutions which may only serve to reduce the gravity of the situation. Though 
long-term plans can be drawn up as in the case of the NRZ, full implementation 
of such plans is not usually carried out.
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